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1Adversarial Deep Learning for Over-the-Air
Spectrum Poisoning Attacks
Yalin E. Sagduyu,Yi Shi, and Tugba Erpek
Abstract—An adversarial deep learning approach is presented to launch over-the-air spectrum poisoning attacks. A transmitter
applies deep learning on its spectrum sensing results to predict idle time slots for data transmission. In the meantime, an adversary
learns the transmitter’s behavior (exploratory attack) by building another deep neural network to predict when transmissions will
succeed. The adversary falsifies (poisons) the transmitter’s spectrum sensing data over the air by transmitting during the short
spectrum sensing period of the transmitter. Depending on whether the transmitter uses the sensing results as test data to make
transmit decisions or as training data to retrain its deep neural network, either it is fooled into making incorrect decisions (evasion
attack), or the transmitter’s algorithm is retrained incorrectly for future decisions (causative attack). Both attacks are energy efficient
and hard to detect (stealth) compared to jamming the long data transmission period, and substantially reduce the throughput. A
dynamic defense is designed for the transmitter that deliberately makes a small number of incorrect transmissions (selected by the
confidence score on channel classification) to manipulate the adversary’s training data. This defense effectively fools the adversary (if
any) and helps the transmitter sustain its throughput with or without an adversary present.
Index Terms—Adversarial machine learning, deep learning, spectrum poisoning, jamming, exploratory attack, evasion attack,
causative attack, adversarial attacks, defense.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
MACHINE learning provides wireless communicationswith automated means to learn from and adapt to
dynamic spectrum environment that includes a variety of
topology, channel, traffic, and interference effects [1], [2],
[3]. Examples of machine learning applications in wireless
communications include spectrum sensing [4], channel es-
timation [5], spectrum access [6], power control [7], signal
classification [8], and augmentation [9].
Wireless communication is vulnerable to different types
of attacks such as jamming [10] and eavesdropping [11]
due to its open broadcast nature. Dynamic spectrum ac-
cess (DSA) is especially sensitive to attacks as it involves
various tunable parameters that can be manipulated by
adversaries [12]. One example is the primary user emulation
(PUE) attack, where an adversary pretends to be a primary
user and aims to decrease the spectrum access opportu-
nities of cognitive radios [13]. In a collaborative sensing
environment, another example is the spectrum sensing data
falsification (SSDF) attack that targets the spectrum sensing
operation by falsifying spectrum sensing reports [14].
As machine learning starts finding more applications in
wireless communications, the safe use of machine learning
algorithms is emerging as a major security concern. In par-
ticular, machine learning itself may become the target of the
• Y. E. Sagduyu is with Intelligent Automation, Inc., Rockville, MD, USA.
E-mail: ysagduyu@i-a-i.com
• Y. Shi and T. Erpek are with Virginia Tech., Electrical and Computer En-
gineering, Blacksburg/Arlington, VA, USA. Email: {yshi,terpek}@vt.edu
c© 2019 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from
IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media,
including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional
purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers
or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works.
adversary. Such security issues have been studied in other
data domains (e.g., computer vision) in the emerging field
of adversarial machine learning. Examples include exploratory
(inference) attacks to infer how a machine learning algorithm
operates (e.g., learn a classifier’s decision boundaries) [15],
evasion attacks to fool a machine learning algorithm into
making wrong decisions (e.g., fool a trained filter into
misclassifying spam emails) [16], [17], and causative attacks
to provide incorrect information (e.g., training data in su-
pervised learning) to a machine learning algorithm [18].
When adversarial machine learning is applied to wire-
less communications, the objective is not anymore to di-
rectly attack wireless communications but to manipulate
the underlying cognitive engine based on machine learn-
ing algorithms. One important difference from other data
domains (e.g., computer vision classifier APIs) is that the
adversary and the target in wireless communications ob-
serve different features (due to different channel and in-
terference effects) and use different classification labels (as
they perceive different events). In [6], [7], an adversary
was designed to build a deep neural network to mimic
how the DSA algorithm works and then jams the data
transmissions by first running its own surrogate classifier
to determine successful transmission opportunities. While
this attack decreases the throughput, it incurs major energy
consumption and leaves a large footprint for easy detection.
In this paper, we develop a new type of wireless attack
based on adversarial machine learning, namely the over-the-
air spectrum poisoning attack that targets the sensing period
of a transmitter under attack. This is a stealth attack that
is energy-efficient and does not leave a large footprint
compared with previous attacks. Unlike traditional denial
of service attacks [19], where the adversary transmits to jam
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2data transmissions, the adversary aims to manipulate the
spectrum sensing data by jamming the spectrum sensing
period so that the target transmitter makes wrong decisions
by using the unreliable spectrum sensing results. This attack
also differs from the SSDF attack, since the adversary does
not participate in cooperative spectrum sensing and does
not try to change the estimated channel labels directly as in
the SSDF attack. Instead, the adversary injects adversarial
perturbations over the air (in terms of jamming the spec-
trum sensing period) to the channel in order to fool the
transmitter into making wrong transmit decisions or make
the transmitter’s re-training process fail. To counteract such
attacks, we develop a defense mechanism that uses the clas-
sification outputs of the transmitter’s deep neural network
to add controlled errors into channel access decisions of the
transmitter and consequently mislead the adversary.
We consider a canonical wireless communication sce-
nario with a transmitter, its corresponding receiver, an ad-
versary, and some other background traffic. We apply dif-
ferent channel models including Gaussian, Rayleigh, Rician,
and log-normal channels. Note that the proposed attacks are
independent of the network topology and can be directly ap-
plied to other network topologies. We also show results for
multiple background traffic sources. For this case, aggregate
traffic is observed through spectrum sensing that inputs the
aggregated signal to the transmitter and jammer algorithms.
If there are multiple adversaries, each of them and the
jammer can individually apply their proposed algorithms
(while treating interference the same way as background
traffic). The transmitter builds a machine learning model
(based on a deep neural network) to predict the busy and
idle states of the channel. The adversary applies adversarial
deep learning to launch various attacks, including exploratory
attack, evasion attack in test phase, causative attack in training
phase, and their combinations. As a defense strategy, the
transmitter launches an attack back on the cognitive engine
of the adversary and aims to degrade the inference stage of
the adversary.
The main contributions of this paper are on stealth and
energy-efficient attacks on wireless communications built
upon adversarial machine learning and a corresponding
defense scheme. We present novel techniques for
• exploratory (inference) attacks by observing the spec-
trum and feedback on transmission outcomes in
communications (see Section 1.1),
• evasion attacks on spectrum sensing of wireless com-
munications in test phase (see Section 1.2),
• causative attacks on spectrum sensing of wireless
communication in training phase (see Section 1.3),
and
• defense scheme against all these attacks (see Sec-
tion 1.4).
1.1 Exploratory (Inference) Attack
The adversary applies adversarial deep learning to launch an
exploratory attack. For that purpose, the adversary trains a
deep neural network. Subsequently, it intentionally changes
the transmitter’s sensing results by transmitting when it
predicts that there will be a successful transmission if there
were no attacks.
The training data of the transmitter consists of time-
series of spectrum sensing results as features and channel
idle/busy status based on the ground truth (the background
transmitter’s on/off state) as labels. Using this training data,
the transmitter builds a deep neural network to make trans-
mit decisions. If a transmission is successful (i.e., the signal-
to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) exceeds a threshold),
the receiver sends an acknowledgement (ACK) to the trans-
mitter and the adversary can detect the presence of this ACK
(without decoding its content).
The adversary first determines the time slot structure
used by the transmitter and then performs an exploratory
attack to build a classifier that can predict the outcome of
transmissions, i.e., whether there will be an ACK if there
is no attack. The adversary uses time-series of its own
spectrum sensing results as features and presence/absence
of ACKs as labels in its training and test data. Note that this
is not a standard exploratory attack and the classifier built
by the adversary will not be the same as (or similar to) the
classifier used by the transmitter, due to the following two
differences.
• The transmitter and the adversary are in different
locations and thus their sensing results will vary
based on the channel environment and differ from
each other. As a result, the input data (features) to
their classifiers will differ.
• The adversary predicts the outcome of the trans-
missions (‘ACK’ or ‘no ACK’) while the transmitter
predicts channel status (‘idle’ or ‘busy’). As a result,
the output data of their classifiers will differ.
Once the adversary develops its deep neural network
model as part of an exploratory attack, it uses this classifier
to perform either an evasion attack in the test phase or
causative attack in the training phase.
1.2 Evasion Attack in Test Phase
After building its classifier, the adversary predicts when the
transmitter will have a successful transmission (if there was
no attack) and performs the evasion attack in test phase, i.e.,
the adversary transmits to change the channel status in or-
der to poison (i.e., falsify) the transmitter’s input (spectrum
sensing data) to the machine learning algorithm. The attack
considered in this paper is similar to that in [6], [7], where
the adversary also first learns the transmitter’s behavior
(ACK or not) by an exploratory attack and then performs
subsequent attacks. The difference is that in [6], [7], the
adversary performs a standard jamming attack during the
data transmission period to make a transmission fail while
in this paper the adversary performs an evasion attack in
the sensing period such that the transmitter is provided
with incorrect input data (manipulated over the air) to its
classifier and makes the wrong decision of not transmitting.
This attack is harder to detect since it does not directly jam
the transmitter’s signal but it changes the input data to the
decision mechanism. Moreover, this attack is more energy
efficient since the adversary makes a very short transmission
in the sensing period.
We show that this adversarial deep learning approach
significantly reduces the transmitter’s performance. In par-
ticular, for the scenario studied in numerical results, only
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Fig. 1. Overview of adversarial machine learning proposed in this paper.
few transmission attempts are made when the evasion at-
tack is launched and the achieved throughput (normalized
by the best throughput by an ideal algorithm to detect every
idle channel) drops from 98.96% to 3.13%. For comparison
purposes, we consider the same energy budget (namely,
the energy consumption of spectrum poisoning attack) and
study an attack that jams data transmission period (much
longer than spectrum sensing period). Due to this small
energy budget, an adversary cannot jam the data trans-
mission period of all time slots that will have a successful
transmission. Thus, the normalized throughput can only be
reduced to 41.67%, which is much higher than 3.13% under
the evasion attack on the data sensing period.
1.3 Causative Attack in Training Phase
For the case that the transmitter collects additional training
data and retrains its classifier, the adversary can also apply
a causative attack on the training data after determining
the start and end of training phase. The classifier of the
transmitter is then updated by using some incorrect data
and thus becomes worse than before retraining. As a result,
even if there is no further attack, the transmitter will make
incorrect decisions in the future and its performance will
drop. This attack is even harder to detect and more energy
efficient than evasion attack since the adversary’s transmis-
sions are limited to sensing periods of only the retraining
phase. For the scenario studied in numerical results, the
normalized throughput drops from 98.96% to 87.27% while
a defender that monitors data transmissions cannot find a
jamming signal. A causative attack can be followed by other
attacks after the transmitter’s classifier is updated, such as
evasion attack on the data sensing period and jamming
attack on the transmission period. Both attacks can further
reduce the transmitter’s throughput. When combined with
causative attack, evasion attack reduces throughput to a
smaller value (2.72%) than jamming (37.27%).
The overview of these attacks is shown in Figure 1.
1.4 Defense Scheme
Since the adversary can significantly reduce the transmit-
ter’s throughput, it is necessary to develop a defense scheme.
One approach to protect a neural network against adver-
sarial machine learning is adding randomness to the neural
network structure (namely, weights and biases) [20]. This
defense is effective if an adversary can access the output
layer of a neural network (labels and scores). However, it
cannot be applied in wireless communications, since the ad-
versary collects its training data indirectly by observing the
outcome of transmissions (without obtaining a score). Also,
small randomness may not change the outcome of transmis-
sions while large randomness will impact T ’s performance.
Instead, we design a defense scheme where the transmitter
intentionally makes some incorrect transmit decisions to
manipulate the training data of the adversary so that the
adversary cannot build a reliable deep learning model. This
corresponds to a causative attack by the transmitter on the
adversary’s inference attack stage. These incorrect transmit
decisions should be made on a carefully selected set of
time slots to balance the trade-off between the large impact
on the adversary’s classifier and small loss in transmitter’s
performance due to incorrect transmit decisions. We select
these time slots from those with the classification score
(provided by the deep learning classifier of the transmitter)
that is far away from the decision boundary. We show
that this defense mechanism can increase the normalized
throughput from 3.13% to 76.04% against evasion attacks,
and can be effectively applied against other attacks, as well,
by adapting the level of defense without knowing whether
an adversary is present, or not.
1.5 Paper Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
reviews related work on wireless attacks and adversarial
machine learning. Section 3 describes the system model.
Section 4 describes the transmitter’s algorithm and shows
the performance without an attack. Section 5 describes the
adversary’s algorithm and shows the performance under
different attacks. Section 6 presents a defense mechanism
and shows how it improves the performance. Section 7
concludes the paper.
2 RELATED WORK
There are various security concerns regarding the safe use
of machine learning algorithms. For example, if the input
data to a machine learning algorithm is manipulated during
the training or operation (test) time, the output will be very
different compared to the expected results. These particular
security threats are addressed in the emerging field of
adversarial machine learning, which studies learning in the
presence of adversaries and aims to enable safe adoption of
machine learning to the emerging applications.
Attacks under adversarial machine learning are divided
into three broad categories, namely exploratory (or inference)
attacks, evasion attacks, and causative attacks.
• In exploratory attacks [15], [21], [22], the adversary
aims to understand how the underlying machine
learning works for an application (e.g., inferring
sensitive and/or proprietary information).
• In evasion attacks [16], [17], the adversary attempts
to fool the machine learning algorithm into making
a wrong decision (e.g., fooling a security algorithm
into accepting an adversary as legitimate).
• In causative attacks [18], the adversary provides in-
correct information such as training data to machine
learning.
4These attacks can be launched separately or combined, i.e.,
causative and evasion attacks can be launched by making
use of the inference results from an exploratory attack [23].
For wireless applications, the evasion attack was considered
in [24], [25], [26], [27] by adding adversarial perturbations
to fool receivers to misclassify signal types (such as modu-
lations). Adversarial distortions were considered in [28] to
support anti-jamming by deceiving the jammers learning
algorithms in a game-theoretic framework. Built upon ex-
ploratory attacks, deep learning was studied in [6], [7] to
launch jamming attacks on data transmissions. This paper
focuses on attacks during spectrum sensing of wireless
communications. In [29], we performed the preliminary
study on exploratory and evasion attacks on data sensing
for wireless communications and corresponding defense
strategies.
Apart from adversarial machine learning, there are dif-
ferent types of attacks on the spectrum sensing decisions
studied in the literature [12], [30], [46]. In a collaborative
sensing environment, some users may send falsified reports
to each other or to a decision center. This corresponds to
a spectrum sensing data falsification (SSDF) attack that aims
to degrade the performance of spectrum sensing [31], [32].
The attacks proposed in this paper are different from SSDF
attacks, since the adversary does not participate in collab-
orative spectrum sensing and does not falsify estimated
spectrum sensing results but rather, it transmits in the
spectrum sensing period to change the inputs to spectrum
classifier over the air. Another type of attack, the primary user
emulation (PUE) attack, aims decrease the spectrum access
opportunities of cognitive radios. A defense technique for
PUE attacks using belief propagation was studied in [13].
Cognitive radio networks are also susceptible to conven-
tional security threats such as jamming [33], eavesdropping
[11] and noncooperation [34]. These threats on wireless com-
munications extend from physical layer to higher layers,
e.g., attacks on routing in the network layer [35] and net-
work flow inference attacks [36]. Wireless security finds rich
applications of deep learning. Deep learning was applied
to authenticate signals [37], detect and classify jammers of
different types [38], [39], [40], and control communications
to mitigate jamming effects [41], [42], [47]. Using wireless
sensors, deep learning was also used to infer private infor-
mation in analogy to exploratory attacks [43].
In this paper, we study adversarial machine learning
attacks on spectrum sensing under a small energy budget.
Following an exploratory attack, we consider an evasion
attack in test phase and as a causative attack in training
phase. We also consider combination of these attacks along
with jamming data transmissions. Moreover, we propose a
defense scheme in this paper to counteract these new types
of attacks.
3 SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a communication system that includes a trans-
mitter T , a receiver R, an adversary A and some back-
ground traffic source B that may transmit its data. These
nodes operate on a single channel. The network topology to
generate numerical results is shown in Figure 2. As noted
in Section 1, the proposed attacks can be applied to other
Transmitter 𝑇
at (0,0)
Receiver 𝑅
at (10,0)
Background
traffic source 𝐵
at (0,10)
Adversary 𝐴
at (10,10)
Fig. 2. The network topology.
network topologies. We assume that T and R are cognitive
radios that can run algorithms developed in this paper and
can perform spectrum sensing and transmit and receive data
and feedback, as specified in algorithm solution. We mostly
focus on fixed locations in this paper. We will discuss the
impact of mobile nodes in Section 4.
The transmission pattern of B is not known by T or A a
priori, and can be detected via spectrum sensing. Packets
arrive at B randomly according to the Bernoulli process
with rate λ (packet/slot). IfB is not transmitting, it becomes
active with certain probability when its queue is not empty.
Once activated, it will keep transmitting until its queue
becomes empty. Thus, there may be a continuous period of
busy slots and its length depends on the number of packets
inB’s queue, which is related to the number of previous idle
slots. Therefore, channel busy/idle states are correlated over
time, and both T and A need to observe the past channel
status over a time period to predict the current channel
status.
Time is divided in slots. Within each slot, the initial short
period of time is allocated by T for spectrum sensing and
the ending short period of time is allocated for feedback (i.e.,
ACK). The rest of a slot is for data transmission if channel is
detected as idle. The decision of T is based on a classifier CT
(trained by deep learning) that analyzes sensing results and
then determines the time slot status such that a time slot is
busy if background traffic is detected and idle otherwise. CT
is independent of A’s actions. Each sensing result is either
• noise N0 (idle time slot) or
• noise plus the received power from background traf-
fic N0+gBT (t)P (busy time slot), where gBT (t) is the
channel gain from B to T at time t and P is transmit
power at B.
Data transmission is successful if the SNR γ = gTR(t)PTN0 or
the SINR γ = gTR(t)PTN0+gBR (t)PB
at the receiver R is not less than
a threshold γmin, where gTR is the channel gain from T toR.
We assume Gaussian noise at R and Gaussian channel gain
from T to R. Results for other channel models, i.e., Rayleigh
channel, Rician channel, and log-normal channel, are also
presented in Section 4. Channel quality changes over time.
The mean value of the channel gain is calculated based on
the free-space propagation loss model. Note that algorithms
in this paper are not tied to any channel model. R sends an
ACK for each successful transmission.
Before launching an attack, A first determines the length
of a time slot and the length of sensing, transmission,
5TABLE 1
Notation.
Symbol Definition
A The adversary
B The background traffic source
Ci Node i’s classifier
CT˜ Updated classifier for TCi(Ft) Classifier Ci’s output on features Ft
dij Distance from node i to node j
Dtest Test data set
Dˆtest Test data set for A under T ’s defense
actions
Dtrain Training data set
Dˆtrain Training data set for A under T ’s defense
actions
e(Ci) Error probability for classifier Ci
eFA (Ci) False alarm probability for classifier Ci
eMD (Ci) Misdetection probability for classifier Ci
Ft Features for time slot t
gij(t) Channel gain from node i to j at time t
H Set of deep learning hyperparameter
values
H Feasible region for deep learning
hyperparameters
lt The label (ACK or not) at time t
Li(H,Dtrain, Dtest) Function for deep learning process of
node i on given H , Dtrain, and Dtest
MSr Success ratio among all transmissions
MTh Normalized throughput
MTr Transmission ratio
nbusy Number of busy time slots in Dtest
nidle Number of idle time slots in Dtest
nFA (Ci) Number of false alarms for classifier Ci
nMD (Ci) Number of misdetections for classifier Ci j
nnew Number of most recent sensing results in
each Ft
N0 Noise
pt Sensed power at time t
p(s) Classification score for sample s
P Transmit power
Pd Ratio of T ’s defense actions
R The receiver
s A sample
St The idle/busy status at time slot t
ti An inter-arrival time between two ACKs
T A transmitter
γ SNR or SINR
γmin SNR or SINR threshold for a successful
transmission
λ Arrival rate of B
τ Classification threshold
and feedback periods in a time slot based on its spectrum
sensing results. For that purpose, A senses the channel over
a period of time to collect data. Then A can detect ACKs
reliably because of the unique properties of ACKs. First, an
ACK always follows an active data transmission period and
is followed by an inactive sensing period. Second, ACK itself
is a short transmission period with a reliable modulation
and coding scheme, which is different than the scheme used
for data transmissions. The inter-arrival time between two
ACKs is an integer times the length of a time slot, since some
time slots do not have an ACK. The problem of determining
the time slot length from multiple observations of such inter-
arrival times is solved by Algorithm 1. Once the length of a
time slot is determined, A can further determine the sensing
and transmission periods in a time slot. In a time slot with
ACK, there is a successful transmission and thus the starting
Algorithm 1 Determine the length of a time slot
1: A observes the spectrum over a time period and identi-
fies ACKs.
2: Initialize a list I that includes inter-arrival times
t1, t2, · · · , tm of these ACKs.
3: Find ti∗ as the smallest number in I .
4: for i = 1 to m, i 6= i∗ do
5: k =
⌊
ti
ti∗
⌋
, tˆi = ti − kti∗
6: if tˆi ≈ 0 then
7: Remove ti from I .
8: else
9: Replace ti by tˆi.
10: end if
11: end for
12: if I has only one element ti∗ then
13: Return ti∗ .
14: else
15: Go to Step 3.
16: end if
point of such a transmission (with higher sensed power than
idle cases) determines the sensing period (before this point)
and the data transmission period (after this point).
Then for each time slot, A aims to predict whether
there will be a successful transmission (ACK) if there is no
attack. Note that A only detects the presence of the ACK
message but does not need to decode it. The prediction
by A is based on another classifier CA that is trained by
A using deep learning. If A predicts that there will be a
successful transmission, it performs some attack to reduce
the throughput of T . In this paper, we consider the attack
of transmitting in the initial short sensing period to change
the sensing result of T for the current time slot. Since this
sensing result is an input to CT on time slot status, T may
make a wrong decision, even if CT was trained properly.
The advantage of this attack, comparing with the con-
tinuous jamming attack, is that the initial sensing period
is much shorter than the data transmission period. As a
result, the power consumption of this attack is much less
compared to continuous jamming. In addition, it is harder
to detect this attack compared to continuous jamming due
to its small footprint.
T may also apply a defense mechanism to mitigate
such attacks. For that purpose, T takes wrong actions in a
controlled manner such that the ‘ACK’ or ‘no ACK’ results
(namely labels for CA) are changed. As a consequence, CA
cannot be reliably trained and the attack performance drops.
However, T needs to minimize the number of these wrong
actions such that the performance loss due to wrong channel
access decisions remains small. In Section 6, we will show
how to carefully select a small set of time slots (depending
on the classification score of T ) and take wrong actions only
in these slots to better mislead A. Table 1 lists the notation
used in this paper.
4 TRANSMITTER’S ALGORITHM
T senses the spectrum, identifies an idle time slot (when B
is not transmitting), and then decides whether to transmit
or not. T applies a deep learning classifier CT to identify
6Algorithm 2 T ’s training algorithm
1: T collects sensing data over a time period to build its
training data Dtrain.
2: T builds a training sample {Ft, St} for each time t ≥
nnew, where Ft = (pt−nnew−1, pt−nnew−2, · · · , pt), pt is
the sensed power at time t, and St is the busy/idle status
at time t.
3: T trains a deep learning classifier CT using training data
Dtrain.
𝑇’s classifierSensing data
Predicted 
channel status
𝑇’s defense (optional)
Transmit or not
Fig. 3. T ’s classifier in test time.
idle time slots. CT is pre-trained using a number of samples,
where a sample for time t has the most recent nnew sensing
results pt−nnew−1, pt−nnew−2, · · · , pt as features Ft and the
current busy/idle status St as the label. nnew is potentially
a design parameter for T and can be tuned by T to optimize
its performance. In this paper, we assume nnew = 10. Each
sensing result is either a Gaussian noise with normalized
power N0 (idle time slot) or noise plus the transmit power
from another user N0 + gBT (t)P (busy time slot), where
noise and the channel gain are random variables with Gaus-
sian distributions. After observing a certain period of time,
T collects a number of samples to be used as training data
Dtrain to build a deep learning classifier CT . T ’s training
algorithm is summarized in Algorithm 2.
Once CT is built, T uses it to predict the channel status
of each time slot and transmit if it predicts a given time slot
as idle. The block diagram in Figure 3 shows T ’s operation
in test time. Note that there is an optional block of defense,
which will be discussed later in Section 6. This prediction
algorithm is summarized in Algorithm 3. In this algorithm,
two types of errors may be incurred:
• Misdetection. A busy time slot is detected as idle, i.e.,
St = ‘busy’ and CT (Ft) = ‘idle‘.
• False alarm. An idle time slot it is detected as busy,
i.e., St = ‘idle’ and CT (Ft) = ‘busy’.
Transmitter T aims to minimize error probability e(CT ) =
max{e
MD
(CT ), eFA(CT )} to balance misdetections and false
alarms, where e
MD
(CT ) is the misdetection probability and
e
FA
(CT ) is the false alarm probability for classifier CT .
This objective is important, especially when data is im-
balanced among labels. These error probabilities are cal-
culated by e
MD
(CT ) = nMD (CT )nbusy and eFA(CT ) =
n
FA
(CT )
nidle
,
where n
MD
(CT ) is the number of misdetections, nbusy is
the number of busy time slots in Dtest, nFA(CT ) is the
number of false alarms, and nidle is the number of idle time
slots in Dtest. There are many hyperparameters in deep
learning, e.g., the number of layers in the neural network
and the number neurons per layer. Denote H as a set of
hyperparameter values and H as the feasible region for
hyperparameters. In addition to training the deep neural
network (namely, determining weights and biases), these
Algorithm 3 T ’s prediction algorithm
1: At time t, T senses channel and obtains power pt.
2: T builds a test sample Ft =
(pt−nnew−1, pt−nnew−2, · · · , pt).
3: T uses its classifier CT to decide on a label (‘busy’ or
‘idle’) for the test sample at time slot t, i.e., computes
CT (Ft).
hyperparameters should also be optimized to minimize
e(CT ). Hyperparameter selection leads to the following op-
timization problem.
OptHyper:
minimize e(CT )
subject to e(CT ) ≥ eMD (CT ), e(CT ) ≥ eFA(CT ),
e
MD
(CT ) = nMD (CT )
nbusy
, e
FA
(CT ) = nFA(CT )
nidle
,
CT = LT (H,Dtrain), H ∈ H,
where LT (H,Dtrain) is T ’s function for deep learning pro-
cess on given hyperparameters H and training data Dtrain.
Note that the closed form expression of LT (·) is unknown
due to the complex neural network built in deep learning.
Therefore, standard optimization techniques such as convex
optimization cannot be applied to solve OptHyper. In this
paper, we find local optimal solution to OptHyper by apply-
ing a greedy sequential-fixing algorithm that starts with an
initial set of parameter values and optimizes one parameter
value (while keeping others unchanged) in each round until
all parameter values are optimized. In addition, we solve
OptHyper by Hyperband [48], which starts with a number
of settings of parameter values and check their performance
with a limited number of training epochs. This approach can
still achieve good performance (local optimal solution) with
low complexity. Based on the current performance results
for each setting, some bad settings are removed. In the next
round, remaining settings will continue for more epochs
and more accurate performance results will be obtained to
further remove some bad settings. After several rounds, a
final solution on parameters will be obtained likely with
good performance by considering many settings. On the
other hand, it has low complexity since most of settings
can be removed without a complete training process. Al-
ternatively, a random search approach in [44] could be used
for low complexity but performance is not good as only a
small random portion of the large search space is covered.
OptHyper could also be solved by genetic algorithm that can
find good solutions on parameters at the expense of high
time complexity.1
We use TensorFlow [45] to build CT with an FNN struc-
ture shown in Figure 4. The following hyperparameters are
selected as a local optimal solution by solving OptHyper for
the deep neural network of CT :
1. H is used as chromosome and the algorithm starts with a number
of initial solutions on H , which is the first generation. Once a termina-
tion condition (e.g., no signification improvement on e(CT ) over some
generations) is met, the best solution in the current generation on H is
the final solution by the genetic algorithm.
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Fig. 4. The structure of a feedforward neural network.
• An FNN is trained with backpropagation algorithm
by using cross-entropy as the loss function. Cross-
entropy function is given by
CE(θ) = −
∑
i
(
[yT ]i log[a
L(xT )]i + (1− [yT ]i)·
log(1− [aL(xT )]i)
)
,
where θ is the set of the neural network parameters,
xT is the training data vector, yT is the correspond-
ing label vector, and aL (xT ) is the output of the
neural network at the last (output) layer L.
• Number of hidden layers is 3.
• Number of neurons per hidden layer is 100.
• Rectified linear unit (ReLU) is used as activation
function at hidden layers. ReLU performs the f(x) =
max(0, x) operation on input x.
• Softmax is used as the activation function at output
layer. Softmax performs f(x)i = exi/
∑
j e
xj on
input x.
• Batch size is 100.
• Number of training steps is 1000.
In the simulation, background traffic arrives at back-
ground transmitter B at rate of λ = 0.8 packet per time slot.
When B has queued data packet, it may decide to transmit
at rate of 1 packet per time slot and once it transmits, it will
continue until the queue is empty. The channel gain g
BT
(t)
is a random variable with a Gaussian distribution and the
expected value d−2BT , where dBT is the distance between B
and T . In the simulation setting, the location of B is (0, 10),
the location of T is (0, 0), and the transmit power at B is
P = 1000 (normalized with respect to the unit noise power).
T collects 1000 samples, each with the most recent 10
spectrum sensing results and a label (‘idle’ or ‘busy’). Half
of these samples are used as training data and the other
half of them are used as test data. The optimized deep
learning classifier CT minimizes its error e(CT ). In this test
phase, there are 403 busy and 97 idle time slots found in
the test data. Among them, 3 busy time slots are identified
as idle and no idle time slot is identified as busy. Thus,
e
FA
(CT ) = 0%, eMD (CT ) = 3/403 = 0.74% and e(CT ) =
0.74%. This small error shows that T can reliably predict the
channel status of a given time slot when there is no attack.
Note that we achieve this small error by optimizing deep
learning hyperparameters. Other parameters may result in
worse performance. For example, if the number of hidden
layers is changed to 10 and the number of neurons per
hidden layer is changed to 50, we end up with e
FA
(CT ) =
0%, e
MD
(CT ) = 5/403 = 1.24%, and e(CT ) = 1.24% that are
worse what can be achieved with hyperparameter tuning.
When we use Hyperband for hyperparameter optimization,
the deep neural network is determined to have three hidden
layers, with 89, 119, and 109 neurons, and we end up with
e
FA
(CT ) = 1.03%, eMD (CT ) = 0.99%, and e(CT ) = 1.03%.
The classifier with the best set of hyperparameters is
implemented on the embedded GPU platform, Nvidia Jet-
son Nano. The run time to get one classification result in
test time (namely, to run one sample through the deep
neural network) is measured as 0.31 msec. The run time
for adversary’s algorithm to be developed later is similar.
T transmits in idle time slots detected by CT . If the SNR
(or SINR) γ at receiver R is no less than a threshold γmin =
3, R confirms a successful transmission by sending an ACK
to T . We set the location of R as (10, 0) and the transmit
power at T as P = 1000 (again normalized with respect to
the unit noise power). T applies its deep learning classifier
on 500 time slots and makes transmission decisions. In this
training phase, there are 404 busy and 96 idle time slots.
Among them, 2 busy time slots are identified as idle and
transmissions in these 2 slots fail, while 96 idle time slots
are correctly identified as idle and transmissions in 95 slots
are successful.
We evaluate the achieved normalized throughput MTh,
which is defined as the ratio of the number of success-
ful transmissions to the number of idle time slots. In
simulations, we measure MTh = 95/96 = 98.96%. We
also evaluate the success ratio MSr, which is defined as
the ratio of the number of successful transmissions to the
number of all transmissions. In simulations, we measure
MSr = 95/(96 + 2) = 96.94%. Due to small errors in
detecting busy/idle time slots, normalized throughput and
success ratio achieved by T ’s algorithm are high. Finally,
we evaluate the overall transmission ratio MTr, which is
defined as the ratio of the number of all transmissions
to the number of all slots. In simulations, we measure
MTr = (96 + 2)/500 = 19.60%.
In this paper, we focus on deep learning based algo-
rithms, which has better performance than other machine
learning algorithms. For example, T can also use an SVM
based classifier to analyze sensing data. We found that the
performance of this classifier is worse, namely eFA(CA) =
16.49% and eMD(CA) = 1.74%. Both error probabilities
are much larger than the performance of the deep learn-
ing classifier. Also note that the search space of OptHyper
includes the case of one hidden layer (i.e., neural network)
during the search and finds that deep learning solution with
three hidden layers has higher accuracy (99.26% by deep
neural network vs. 96.88% by a neural network with a single
hidden layer).
Next, we consider the impact of different channel mod-
els. Three additional models, i.e., Rayleigh channel model,
Rician channel model, and log-normal channel model, are
studied under the same setting assumed for all other factors.
From Table 2, we can see that deep learning can build an
accurate classifier for each of these channel models (with
errors less than 5%), although the error probabilities are
different under different channel models.
To consider the impact of locations, we change the
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Results under different channel models.
Channel model Misdetection False alarm
Gaussian 0.74% 0%
Rayleigh 4.91% 4.42%
Rician 2.04% 1.85%
log-normal 1.03% 0.89%
TABLE 3
Results under different background transmitter locations.
Location Misdetection False alarm
(0, 5) 0.53% 0%
(0, 10) 0.74% 0%
(0, 15) 0.74% 1.03%
(0, 20) 4.08% 3.70%
location of background transmitter to (0, 5), (0, 15), and
(0, 20). Results in Table 3 show that error probabilities can
be smaller if the background transmitter is closer to the
transmitter, since the sensed signal will be stronger.
We also consider the impact of mobility, i.e., the classifier
is built when background transmitter is at (0, 10) but then
it moves to (0, 5), (0, 15), and (0, 20), respectively. Results
in Table 4 show that error probabilities can be smaller if the
background transmitter is moved closer to the transmitter,
since the sensed signal will be stronger, otherwise, error
probabilities will be larger as the background transmitter
moves away.
Finally, we consider the case of multiple background
sources. There are two additional background transmitters
at (−5, 10) and (5, 10) with the same transmit power as the
one at (0, 10). To have similar number of idle time slots, the
traffic rates at all these transmitters are set as λ = 0.4 packet
per time slot. If any background transmitter is sending its
data, the channel is busy. The spectrum sensing observes
the aggregated signal from all these transmitters as input to
T ’s classifier. We find that the trained classifier has error
probabilities e
FA
(CT ) = 0%, eMD (CT ) = 0.26%, i.e., it
has better performance than the classifier for the case of
single background source. The reason is that multiple active
sources will generate larger aggregated signal and thus it is
easier to predict the channel status.
5 ADVERSARY’S ALGORITHM
There is an adversary A that aims to reduce transmitter T ’s
performance. As the first step, A needs to determine T ’s
time slot structure (start and end point, and duration) and
its decomposition to sensing, transmission, and feedback
periods. This step is discussed in detail in Section 3. With
TABLE 4
Results under different background transmitter locations.
Location in test phase Misdetection False alarm
(0, 5) 0.53% 0%
(0, 10) 0.74% 0%
(0, 15) 1.24% 1.03%
(0, 20) 1.53% 4.63%
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Fig. 5. The input and output (label) data while training A’s classifier.
the knowledge of T ’s time slot structure, A launches an ex-
ploratory attack to infer CT . Then it analyzes T ’s behavior and
launches different attacks (using the same energy budget).
In this section, we consider two types of attacks.
• Evasion attack. A jams T ’s sensing period such that T
collects wrong channel data samples and thus makes
wrong decisions when it runs its classifier with these
wrong samples.
• Causative attack. Suppose that T collects additional
training data and retrains CT . A jams T ’s sensing
period such that T collects wrong training data and
thus the updated classifier CT˜ fails to improve and
also becomes worse.
5.1 Exploratory Attack
For exploratory attack, A senses the spectrum, predicts
whether there will be a successful transmission (if there was
no attack), and performs certain attacks (if it predicts that
there will be a successful transmission). There are four cases:
1) time slot t is idle (St = ‘idle’) and T is transmitting,
2) time slot t is busy (St = ‘busy’) and T is not
transmitting,
3) time slot t is idle (St = ‘idle’) and T is not transmit-
ting, or
4) time slot t is busy (St = ‘busy’) and T is transmit-
ting.
Since T is transmitting if and only if CT (Ft) = ‘idle’, the
last two cases correspond to false alarm and misdetection
of CT , respectively. Our results in Section 4 show that these
are rare cases and max{eMD(CT ), eFA(CT )} = 0.74%. A
uses the most recent nnew sensing results as the features
and the current feedback (‘ACK’ vs. ‘no ACK’) as the label
to build one training sample. For numerical results, nnew
is assumed to be 10. Note that T and A do not know
classifier parameters of each other including nnew. After
observing a certain period of time, A collects a number of
samples as training data to build a deep learning classifier
that outputs one of two labels, ‘ACK’ (namely, a successful
transmission) and ‘no ACK’ (namely, a failed transmission).
Figure 5 shows the input data and the labels while build-
ing the adversary’s classifier CA. A’s training algorithm is
summarized in Algorithm 4.
The process of building CA can be regarded as an
exploratory attack, since A aims to build CA to infer the
operation of T . There are the following two differences
between these classifiers.
9Algorithm 4 A’s training algorithm
1: A collects data over a time period to build its training
data Dtrain.
2: A builds a training sample (Ft, lt) for each time t ≥
nnew, where Ft = (pt−nnew−1, pt−nnew−2, · · · , pt), pt is
the sensed power at time t, and lt is the label (ACK or
not) at time t.
3: A trains a deep learning classifier CA using its training
data Dtrain.
Algorithm 5 A’s prediction algorithm
1: At time t, A senses channel and collects received power
pt.
2: A builds a test sample Ft =
(pt−nnew−1, pt−nnew−2, · · · , pt).
3: A uses its classifier CA to decide on a label (‘ACK’ or ‘no
ACK’) for the test sample at time slot t, i.e., computes
CA(Ft).
• Due to different locations of T and A, and random
channels, the sensing results at T and A differ. Thus,
features for the same sample are different at T and
A.
• The labels (classes) at T and A are different, i.e.,
labels are ‘busy’ or ‘idle’ in T ’s classifier and ‘ACK’
or ‘no ACK’ in A’s classifier.
Once CA is built, A uses it to predict whether there is a
successful transmission (if there was no attack). This predic-
tion algorithm is given in Algorithm 5. For this algorithm,
there may be two types of errors:
• Misdetection. There will be a successful transmission
but CA predicts that there will not be a successful
transmission, i.e., lt = ‘ACK’ and CA(Ft) = ‘no
ACK’.
• False alarm. There will not be a successful transmis-
sion but CA predicts that there will be a successful
transmission, i.e., lt = ‘no ACK’ and CA(Ft) =
‘ACK’.
A aims to minimize error probability e(CA) =
max{eMD(CA), eFA(CA)}, where eMD(CA) and eFA(CA)
are the probabilities of misdetection and false alarm for CA,
respectively. For that purpose, it trains CA and selects its
hyperparameters. The underlying optimization problem is
similar to the one for T (discussed in Section 4) and thus its
discussion is omitted here.
We use TensorFlow to build CA. In the simulation, we set
the location of A as (10, 10). A collects 1000 samples (each
sample corresponds to 10 most recent sensing results) with
labels in 1000 time slots. Half of these samples are used as
training data and the other half is used as test data. There are
95 successful transmissions in 500 test data. Out of 95 trans-
missions, 4 are predicted as failed transmissions, although
these transmissions are indeed successful. Among 405 failed
transmissions, 8 of them are predicted as successful trans-
missions, although these transmissions indeed fail. Thus,
eFA(CA) = 8/405 = 1.98%, eMD(CA) = 4/95 = 4.21% and
e(CA) = 4.21% This small error shows that A can reliably
predict the successful transmissions by T . The inferred
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Fig. 6. Using A’s classifier for evasion attacks.
classifier CA is further used by A for two additional attacks,
evasion and causative attacks, discussed next.
5.2 Evasion Attack
With CA, A can perform an evasion attack (that targets the
test time of T ) as follows. If CA predicts that a time slot will
have an ACK when there is no attack, A transmits in the
initial sensing period to change T ’s sensing result for the
current time slot. This sensing result is one feature of T ’s
classifier (part of Ft in time slot t) and thus T may make
a wrong decision (namely, T may misclassify the status of
time slot t), even if CT was built successfully to predict
idle/busy channel states in the absence of attacks. Com-
pared with a continuous jamming attack, this attack targets
the initial sensing period that is much shorter than the data
transmission period. Hence, the power consumption of this
attack is much less than continuous jamming. There are two
important properties of this attack compared to jamming
data transmissions. First, it is more energy-efficient and can
be used to attack T over a longer period of time (assuming
A is battery-operated). Second, it is more difficult to be
detected by T since A does not jam transmission of T (so
DoS detection mechanisms cannot be readily applied).
Figure 6 illustrates A’s operation for evasion attack. In
the simulation, the transmit power at A is set as P = 1000.
For CT built in Section 4 and 500 time slots considered for
transmissions under the attack, 3 (of 96) idle time slots are
identified as idle and the transmissions in these 3 slots are
all successful, while 1 busy time slot is identified as idle
and the transmission in this slot fails. Thus, the achieved
normalized throughput is MTh = 3/96 = 3.13%, and the
overall success ratio is MSr = 3/(3 + 1) = 75%, while only
very few transmission attempts are made such that the all
transmission ratio isMTr = (3+1)/500 = 0.80%. As a result,
A reduces the throughput of T significantly from MTh =
98.96% to 3.13%, the success ratio from MSr = 96.94% to
75%, and the ratio of transmissions from MTr = 19.60% to
0.80%.
We compare the evasion attack with traditional jamming
attack that targets data transmissions (as studied in [6]),
where A jams when it predicts that T may have a success-
ful transmission (if there was no attack). We consider the
optimistic case that the prediction accuracy is the same as
the deep learning classifier CA. To have a fair comparison,
we consider the same energy budget for these two attacks.
For that purpose, we measure the energy consumption of A
(namely, the ratio of time slots when A transmits) under the
spectrum poisoning attack. Then we use this energy budget
for every other attack considered in this paper. We assume
that the lengths of a sensing period and a transmission
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Fig. 7. Using A’s classifier for causative attacks.
period are 10% and 90% of the entire time slot, respectively
(we ignore the small end period for feedback). We also
assume that the energy budget allows A to transmit in the
entire sensing period for all time slots. Then for jamming
attack, A can jam up to 1/9 of all time slots under the same
energy budget. In this case,Awill select time slots with high
probabilities of having an ACK if no attack. T ’s transmission
decisions do not change, i.e., 98 transmissions. Among
them, 40 will be successful under jamming attack. Given
that there are 96 idle time slots, we have MTh = 40/96 =
41.67%,MSr = 40/98 = 40.82%,MTr = 98/500 = 19.60%
for the jamming attack. We can see that under the same
energy budget, jamming attack is not as effective as the
evasion attack considered in this paper.
5.3 Causative Attack
A can also launch a causative attack (that targets the training
process of CT ) by using CA if T is updating CT using
additional training data. To attack the re-training process of
CT , A identifies T ’s re-training phase, namely when it starts
and ends, as follows. We assume such re-training process is
launched periodically. Thus, A can identify T ’s re-training
phase in two steps (see Algorithm 6). In the first step, A
observes the accuracy of using CA to predict ACK. Once
T updates CT , A observes a change in this accuracy. The
time instances of changes can be used to identify the time to
update CT , which is the ending time of re-training phases.
In the second step, A can launch the causative attack with
adjustable length, which corresponds to different estimation
on the length of a re-training phase. If increasing this length
cannot improve the impact of causative attack, the current
length is no less than the length of a re-training phase.
Otherwise, the current length is no more than the length of
a re-training phase. Thus, A can adjust the predicted length
of re-training to determine the actual length. The result of
these two steps determines the re-training phase of T , as
formulated in Algorithm 6.
Once the re-training phases are determined, A performs
a causative attack by transmitting in the initial sensing
period if CA predicts an ACK. To retrain CT , T collects
additional training data but its sensing results are changed
due to A’s transmissions. Hence, this causative attack can
change the training data and then change T ’s classifier to
CT˜ . Thus, T ’s performance drops even ifA does not transmit
later to change sensing results in test time. Comparing with
an evasion attack, the power consumption of this attack is
even smaller than continuous jamming of sensing period.
Algorithm 6 Determine the start and end of re-training
phase
1: A observes the accuracy of CA on whether there will
be an ACK and identifies time instances t1, t2, · · · , tm
when accuracy changes.
2: A finds the optimal parameter ∆ such that
∑m
i=1[ti −
(t1+(i−1)∆)]2 is minimized, which is the time between
two re-training phases.
3: The initial lower and upper bounds for the re-training
length are L and U , respectively.
4: A starts causative attack with two initial estimated
lengths l, l + δ on the re-training phase, where l =
(L+ U)/2.
5: if Causative attack with l+ δ has the same performance
as that by l then
6: Update the upper bound as U = l.
7: else
8: Update the lower bound as L = l.
9: end if
10: if U − L ≤ δ then
11: The re-training length is L.
12: else
13: Go to Step 4.
14: end if
Figure 7 illustrates the adversary’s operation for
causative attacks. In the simulation, the transmit power at
A is set as P = 1000. For the classifier built in Section 4
and 500 time slots considered for transmissions after the
attack, 89 (of 110) idle time slots are identified as idle and
the transmissions in 88 slots are successful, while 69 busy
time slot is identified as idle and 8 transmissions in this slot
are successful. Thus, the achieved normalized throughput
is MTh = (88 + 8)/110 = 87.27%, the overall success
ratio is MSr = (88 + 8)/(89 + 69) = 60.76%, and the
all transmission ratio is MTr = (89 + 69)/500 = 31.60%.
As a result, A increases the ratio of transmissions from
19.60% to 31.60%. However, more transmissions cannot
improve the performance. A reduces the throughput of T
from MTh = 98.96% to 87.27% and reduces the success ratio
from MSr = 96.94% to 60.76% without the need of further
transmissions.
5.4 Causative Attack followed by Evasion or Jamming
Attack
The causative attack can be followed by an evasion attack.
That is, A first launches the causative attack such that T ’s
classifier is updated as CT˜ with wrong samples of additional
training data. Then A also launches the evasion attack such
that the input features to CT˜ are also wrong. As a result, A
reduces the throughput of T from MTh = 98.96% to 2.72%,
the success ratio from MSr = 96.94% to 75.00%, and the
ratio of transmissions from MTr = 19.60% to 0.80%.
The causative attack can also be followed by a jamming
attack (that targets data transmissions) with an energy bud-
get. As discussed in Section 5.2, we assume that A can jam
up to 1/9 of all time slots. Under this setting, A increases the
ratio of transmissions from 19.60% to 31.60%. Again, more
transmissions cannot improve the performance. A reduces
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TABLE 5
Results under various attacks.
Normalized Success All transmission
throughputMTh ratioMSr ratioMTr
no attack 98.96% 96.94% 19.60%
evasion attack 3.13% 75.00% 0.80%
jamming 41.67% 40.82% 19.60%
causative attack 87.27% 60.76% 31.60%
causative + evasion attack 2.72% 75.00% 0.80%
causative + jamming attack 37.27% 25.95% 31.60%
the throughput of T from MTh = 98.96% to 5.45% and
reduces the success ratio from MSr = 96.94% to 3.80%.
Table 5 summarizes the performance of T without an
attack and with various attacks considered in this paper,
and demonstrates the success of these attacks. Overall, the
proposed attacks cause major loss in T ’ performance and
the impact is much more substantial than typical jamming
attacks that target data transmissions under the same energy
budget.
6 DEFENSE STRATEGY
The first step of the proposed attacks is an exploratory attack
to understand how CT works and build CT . One approach
to protect a deep learning algorithm against attacks is
adding some randomness to the deep neural network of
the target and making it more challenging for the adversary
to learn its structure [20]. However, this approach is not
effective, since A does not have access to the last layer of the
neural network of T . However, A can access the outcome
(ACK or not) of T ’s actions (transmissions). Therefore, an
alternative approach is to add randomness directly to T ’s
transmissions, which will in turn change the input to A
(namely, the labels collected by A to build its classifier in the
exploratory attack). Note that a small level of randomness
may not change ACKs much and thus A can still perform
an exploratory attack. On the other hand, a large level of
randomness will randomly change T ’s actions, which makes
T ’s performance worse, even without attack. Note that we
consider a single channel system and thus spectrum handoff
to other channels is not possible as a strategy to confuse the
adversarial attack.
In this paper we consider a defense strategy that se-
lectively changes T ’s actions, i.e., makes T transmit in a
time slot when it is identified as busy2 or not transmit in a
time slot when it is identified as idle. Such changes should
ensure that the observation of A becomes incorrect and
thus it cannot build a good classifier CA. As a consequence,
A cannot perform subsequent attacks effectively, as well.
Moreover, such changes should not reduce T ’s performance
significantly. Therefore, this defense mechanism involves a
2. If there is an attack, this defense will improve the performance
as we show later in this section. However, the impact of this defense
action on throughput is not obvious if there are multiple transmitters
but there is no attack. The reason is that CT is not perfect and thus
an idle channel may be identified as busy. This issue can be resolved
by an alternative defense at R that sends ACK although no packet
is received. As discussed later in this section, this approach achieves
the same defense performance on average without issue of additional
interference to other nodes.
fundamental trade-off between the accuracy of CA and the
performance of T after taking some defense actions. The
problem is how to select a number of time slots such that
taking defense actions on these slots can achieve the maxi-
mum (negative) impact on the accuracy ofA’s classifier. This
can be formulated as an optimization problem as follows.
OptDefense:
maximize e(CA)
subject to e(CA) ≤ eMD(CA), e(CA) ≤ eFA(CA),
eMD(CA) = nMD(CA)
nbusy
, eFA(CA) = nFA(CA)
nidle
,
CA = LA(H, Dˆtrain, Dˆtest), H ∈ H,
|Dtrain − Dˆtrain|
|Dtrain| ≤ Pd,
where Dˆtrain and Dˆtest are training and test data sets
for A under T ’s defense actions, the subtraction of sets
Dtrain − Dˆtrain is the set of elements in Dtrain but not
in Dˆtrain, |D| denotes the size of set D, |Dtrain−Dˆtrain||Dtrain|
is the ratio of defense actions over Dtrain, and Pd is the
maximum allowed ratio on defense actions. A’s function
for deep learning process, LA, depends not only on H and
Dˆtrain but also on Dˆtest), since T does not know when A
collects training data and when A collects test data. Thus,
T takes some ratio of defense actions on Dtrain and Dtest
(assumed to be equal for numerical results).
OptDefense is solved by analyzing the output of CT as
follows. CT provides not only a label for each sample, but
also a score that can be used to measure the confidence of
this classification. That is, there is a score p(s) ∈ [0, 1] for
each sample s. Classifier CT uses a decision boundary for
classification, i.e., if p(s) is less than some decision boundary
τ , sample s is classified as idle, otherwise, sample s is
classified as busy. Note that τ is a hyperparameter in deep
learning and it is selected (along with other hyperparame-
ters) to minimize e(CT ). If the difference between p(s) and τ ,
namely |p(s)−τ |, is large, the confidence of the classification
is high; otherwise, the confidence of the classification is
low. Therefore, to maximize the impact of defense actions,
T should select time slots (samples) with scores far away
from the decision boundary. This decision algorithm with
defense is summarized in Algorithm 7. Thresholds τ0 and τ1
in Step 4 can be determined by using Dtest.3 For example,
we can select Pd of time slots by selecting τ0 such that
3. Alternatively, these thresholds can also be determined by Dtrain.
We use Dtest to be consistent with other results in the paper, i.e., we
always use a classifier on test data to obtain performance results.
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TABLE 6
Results for defense strategy under evasion attack.
# of defense operations Adversary error probabilities Transmitter performance
divided by # of all samples Misdetection False alarm Normalized throughput Success ratio
0% (no defense) 1.98% 4.21% 3.13% 75.00%
10% 6.99% 10.59% 15.63% 15.31%
20% 8.92% 35.29% 41.67% 28.78%
40% 10.12% 42.67% 51.04% 18.22%
60% 17.06% 69.44% 76.04% 18.07%
80% 10.88% 93.22% 56.25% 13.30%
Algorithm 7 T ’s defense algorithm
1: At time t, T senses channel and obtains power pt.
2: T builds a sample s with features Ft =
(pt−nnew−1, pt−nnew−2, · · · , pt).
3: T uses its classifier CT to decide on a label (busy or idle)
and a score p(s).
4: if p(s) < τ0 or p(s) > τ1 then
5: T changes the label with certain probability.
6: end if
7: T transmits if time slot t is still classified as idle, i.e.,
CT (F (t)) = ‘idle’.
|{s : p(s) < τ0}| = Pd · |{s : p(s) < τ}| and selecting τ1
such that |{s : p(s) > τ1}| = Pd · |{s : p(s) > τ}|. The
probability in Step 5 is to randomize T ’s defense actions
among selected time slots, which makes A’s learning more
challenging.
Table 6 shows the results for different Pd under an
evasion attack. With more frequent defense actions (larger
Pd), the achieved normalized throughput MTh increases
from 3.13% to 76.04%. However, further increases in Pd
(beyond 60%) reduce MTh, as the T ’s own channel access
becomes excessively unreliable. Results for defense strategy
against causative attack are similar and thus are omitted. We
can design a search process for Pd to maximize throughput,
according to the adversary’s actions.
The searching process of Pd also works when there is
no adversary. For this extreme case, T will find that any
defense actions will decrease the throughput and thus the
search process will end with the defense level 0% without
knowing whether an adversary is present, or not.
The above defense is performed by T . Instead, R can
also perform defense actions to fool the adversary, i.e., R
can refrain from sending an ACK when a packet is received
or send an ACK when no packet is received. Then A will
observe incorrect labels to build CA.R’s defense strategy can
be realized to have the same outcome (ACK or no ACK) as
T ’s strategy by using 1 bit overhead. There are the following
three cases for T ’s defense strategy.
• Case I: T takes a defense action of not transmitting
when channel is detected as idle. Then R will not
send ACK since there is no transmission.
• Case II: T takes a defense action of transmitting when
channel is detected as busy. Then it is likely that R
will not send ACK since transmission may fail. But if
such a transmission is successful, R will send ACK.
• Case III: T does not take a defense action. Then R
will send ACK if there is a successful transmission.
To ensure the same outcome, R’s defense strategy is imple-
mented for the above three cases as follows.
• Case I: T transmits data with a 1 bit flag of “defense
action”.Rwill not send ACK even if the transmission
is successful.
• Case II: T transmits 1 bit flag of “defense action”. R
will send ACK if the flag is successfully received.
• Case III: If T transmits data, T also transmits a 1 bit
flag of “no defense action”. R will send ACK if the
transmission is successful.
From adversary’s point of view, the two defense strategies
will provide the same outcome and thus the adversary
will build the same classifier under the exploratory attack.
The performance under subsequent attacks (discussed in
Sections 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4) will be similar. The only difference
is that under R’s defense strategy, there are more trans-
missions (for Case I) and thus throughput can be further
improved if these transmissions are successful.
7 CONCLUSION
We applied adversarial machine learning (based on deep
neural networks) to design over-the-air spectrum sensing
poisoning attacks that target the spectrum sensing period
and manipulate the input data of the transmitter in test and
training phases (in form of evasion and causative attacks).
An adversary launches these attacks either to fool the trans-
mitter into making wrong transmit decisions (namely, an
evasion attack) or manipulate its retraining process (namely,
a causative attack). Since the adversary only needs to trans-
mit for a short period of time to manipulate the transmit
decisions, these attacks more energy-efficient and harder to
detect compared to directly jamming data transmissions.
We showed that these attacks substantially decrease the
throughput of the transmitter and are more effective than
conventional jamming attacks. We also combined evasion,
causative, and jamming attacks, and measured their total
impact. To mitigate these attacks, we developed an effec-
tive defense strategy for the transmitter that intentionally
takes wrong actions in selected time slots to mislead the
adversary. These time slots are selected from those with the
classification score that is far away from the decision bound-
ary. We showed that the proposed defense mechanism sig-
nificantly increases the errors in adversary’s decisions and
prevents major losses in the performance of the transmitter.
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